Publications
Joshua Smailes, Sebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. October 2025.
Abstract:As satellite systems become a greater part of critical infrastructure, they have become a significantly more appealing target for attacks. The availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware has made signal spoofing and physical layer attacks more accessible than ever to a wide range of adversaries, from hobbyists to nation-state actors. Legacy systems are particularly vulnerable due to their lack of cryptographic security, and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. In this article, we use radio transmitter fingerprinting to authenticate satellite downlinks, using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the physical layer radio signal. Our SatIQ system employs a Siamese neural network and an autoencoder to extract an efficient encoding of message headers that preserves identifying information. We focus on high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware. We collected 10290000 messages from the Iridium satellite constellation at 25 MS/s, and demonstrate that the SatIQ model trained on this data maintains performance over time without retraining, and can be used on new transmitters with no impact on performance. We analyze the system’s robustness against weather and signal factors, and demonstrate its effectiveness under attack, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.072 and ROC AUC of 0.960. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are effective at authenticating satellite communication, maintain performance over time and across satellite replacement, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay by raising the required budget for attacks.
PDF DOIJoshua Smailes, Edd Salkield, Sebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
2nd Workshop on Security of Space and Satellite Systems (SpaceSec). March 2024.
Abstract:In the wake of increasing numbers of attacks on radio communication systems, a range of techniques are being deployed to increase the security of these systems. One such technique is radio fingerprinting, in which the transmitter can be identified and authenticated by observing small hardware differences expressed in the signal. Fingerprinting has been explored in particular in the defense of satellite systems, many of which are insecure and cannot be retrofitted with cryptographic security. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of radio fingerprinting techniques under interference and jamming attacks, usually intended to deny service. By taking a pre-trained fingerprinting model and gathering a new dataset in which different levels of Gaussian noise and tone jamming have been added to the legitimate signal, we assess the attacker power required in order to disrupt the transmitter fingerprint such that it can no longer be recognized. We compare this to Gaussian jamming on the data portion of the signal, obtaining the remarkable result that transmitter fingerprints are still recognizable even in the presence of moderate levels of noise. Through deeper analysis of the results, we conclude that it takes a similar amount of jamming power in order to disrupt the fingerprint as it does to jam the message contents itself, so it is safe to include a fingerprinting system to authenticate satellite communication without opening up the system to easier denial-of-service attacks.
PDF DOIJoshua Smailes, Sebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 23). November 2023.
Abstract:Due to an increase in the availability of cheap off-the-shelf radio hardware, signal spoofing and replay attacks on satellite ground systems have become more accessible than ever. This is particularly a problem for legacy systems, many of which do not offer cryptographic security and cannot be patched to support novel security measures. Therefore, in this paper we explore radio transmitter fingerprinting in the context of satellite systems. We introduce the SatIQ system, proposing novel techniques for authenticating transmissions using characteristics of the transmitter hardware expressed as impairments on the downlinked radio signal. We look in particular at high sample rate fingerprinting, making device fingerprints difficult to forge without similarly high sample rate transmitting hardware, thus raising the required budget for spoofing and replay attacks. We also examine the difficulty of this approach with high levels of atmospheric noise and multipath scattering, and analyze potential solutions to this problem. We focus on the Iridium satellite constellation, for which we collected 1705202 messages at a sample rate of 25 MS/s. We use this data to train a fingerprinting model consisting of an autoencoder combined with a Siamese neural network, enabling the model to learn an efficient encoding of the message headers that preserves identifying information. We demonstrate the fingerprinting system's robustness under attack by replaying messages using a Software-Defined Radio, achieving an Equal Error Rate of 0.120, and ROC AUC of 0.946. Finally, we analyze its stability over time by introducing a time gap between training and testing data, and its extensibility by introducing new transmitters which have not been seen before. We conclude that our techniques are useful for building fingerprinting systems that are stable over time, can be used immediately with new transmitters without retraining, and provide robustness against spoofing and replay attacks by raising the required budget for attacks.
PDF DOISimon Birnbach, Joshua Smailes, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
2023 IEEE/AIAA 42nd Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). October 2023.
Abstract:Despite their substantially different purposes, a common issue both for many legacy data links and many onboard data buses used in aviation is a lack of authentication and thus a vulnerability to spoofing and message manipulation attacks. This problem has been discussed at length for some prominent technologies of both sorts (e.g., ADS-B, ARINC 429) but is common in many more cases (e.g., ACARS, CPDLC, MIL-STD-1553, RS-485). For ground data links, attacks can take place over-the-air, while for onboard buses an attacker requires some physical access to an aircraft. Yet, in both cases an attacker’s goal is to obtain control of a transceiver on the communication channel. As such, hardware fingerprinting methods are useful in both contexts. Prior work has applied such methods to specific protocols. We now propose a transferable fingerprinting scheme that has applicability in both contexts, describe our experiences in applying it for each and evaluate its performance in benign and malicious conditions. As replacing legacy communication links with newer, more secure protocols is practically challenging, the improvements to practical deployment offered by our system represent a meaningful benefit for real deployment efforts.
PDF DOIYashovardhan Sharma, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2023 European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference (EICC'23). June 2023.
Abstract:Network analysis and machine learning techniques have been widely applied for building malware detection systems. Though these systems attain impressive results, they often are (i) not extensible, being monolithic, well tuned for the specific task they have been designed for but very difficult to adapt and/or extend to other settings, and (ii) not interpretable, being black boxes whose inner complexity makes it impossible to link the result of detection with its root cause, making further analysis of threats a challenge. In this paper we present RADAR, an extensible and explainable system that exploits the popular TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) ontology of adversary behaviour described in the industry-standard MITRE ATT&CK framework in order to unequivocally identify and classify malicious behaviour using network traffic. We evaluate RADAR on a very large dataset comprising of 2,286,907 malicious and benign samples, representing a total of 84,792,452 network flows. The experimental analysis confirms that the proposed methodology can be effectively exploited: RADAR’s ability to detect malware is comparable to other state-of-the-art non-interpretable systems’ capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, RADAR is the first TTP-based system for malware detection that uses machine learning while being extensible and explainable.
PDF DOIJoshua Smailes, Razvan David, Sebastian Kohler, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
. May 2023.
Abstract:Recent years have seen a rapid increase in the number of CubeSats and other small satellites in orbit - these have highly constrained computational and communication resources, but still require robust secure communication to operate effectively. The QUIC transport layer protocol is designed to provide efficient communication with cryptography guarantees built-in, with a particular focus on networks with high latency and packet loss. In this work we provide spaceQUIC, a proof of concept implementation of QUIC for NASA's"core Flight System"satellite operating system, and assess its performance.
PDFEdd Salkield, Marcell Szakály, Joshua Smailes, Simon Birnbach, Sebastian Köhler, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks (WiSec). May 2023.
Abstract:Satellite communications are increasingly crucial for telecommunications, navigation, and Earth observation. However, many widely used satellites do not cryptographically secure the downlink, opening the door for radio spoofing attacks. Recent developments in software-defined radio hardware have enabled attacks on wireless systems including GNSS, which can be effectively spoofed using only cheap hardware available off the shelf. However, these conclusions do not generalize well to other satellite systems such as high data rate backhauls or satellite-to-customer connections, where the spoofing requirements are currently unknown. In this paper, we present a systematic review of spoofing attacks against satellite downlink communications systems. We establish a threat model linking attack feasibility and impact to required budget through real-world experiments and channel simulations. Our results show that nearly all evaluated satellite systems were overshadowable at a distance of 1 km in the worst case, for a budget of ~2000 USD or less. We evaluate how key challenges surrounding modulation schemes, antenna directionality, and legitimate satellite signal strength can be overcome in practice through antenna sidelobe targeting, overshadowing, and automatic gain control takeover. We also show that, surprisingly, protocols designed to be more robust against channel noise are significantly less robust against an overshadowing attacker. We conclude with a discussion of physical-layer countermeasures specifically applicable to satellite systems which can not be cryptographically upgraded.
PDF DOIJoshua Smailes, Edd Salkield, Sebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
. May 2023.
Abstract:Satellite user terminals are a promising target for adversaries seeking to target satellite communication networks. Despite this, many protections commonly found in terrestrial routers are not present in some user terminals. As a case study we audit the attack surface presented by the Starlink router's admin interface, using fuzzing to uncover a denial of service attack on the Starlink user terminal. We explore the attack's impact, particularly in the cases of drive-by attackers, and attackers that are able to maintain a continuous presence on the network. Finally, we discuss wider implications, looking at lessons learned in terrestrial router security, and how to properly implement them in this new context.
PDFSebastian Koehler, Richard Baker, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). February 2023.
Abstract:We present a novel attack against the Combined Charging System, one of the most widely used DC rapid charging technologies for electric vehicles (EVs). Our attack, Brokenwire, interrupts necessary control communication between the vehicle and charger, causing charging sessions to abort. The attack requires only temporary physical proximity and can be conducted wirelessly from a distance, allowing individual vehicles or entire fleets to be disrupted stealthily and simultaneously. In addition, it can be mounted with off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical knowledge. By exploiting CSMA/CA behavior, only a very weak signal needs to be induced into the victim to disrupt communication - exceeding the effectiveness of broadband noise jamming by three orders of magnitude. The exploited behavior is a required part of the HomePlug Green PHY, DIN 70121&ISO 15118 standards and all known implementations exhibit it. We first study the attack in a controlled testbed and then demonstrate it against eight vehicles and 20 chargers in real deployments. We find the attack to be successful in the real world, at ranges up to 47 m, for a power budget of less than 1 W. We further show that the attack can work between the floors of a building (e.g., multi-story parking), through perimeter fences, and from `drive-by' attacks. We present a heuristic model to estimate the number of vehicles that can be attacked simultaneously for a given output power. Brokenwire has immediate implications for a substantial proportion of the around 12 million battery EVs on the roads worldwide - and profound effects on the new wave of electrification for vehicle fleets, both for private enterprise and crucial public services, as well as electric buses, trucks and small ships. As such, we conducted a disclosure to the industry and discussed a range of mitigation techniques that could be deployed to limit the impact.
PDF DOIYashovardhan Sharma, Eleonora Giunchiglia, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
2023 IEEE International Conference on Cyber Security and Resilience (CSR). 2023.
Abstract:In the last decade, machine learning (ML) methods have increasingly been applied to the task of malware detection. While these approaches have surely demonstrated their effectiveness, they still present limitations, some of which are a consequence of their purely data-driven nature. In this paper, we show how the MITRE ATT&CK framework of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) can be exploited to overcome such limitations and improve their ability to detect malware on networks. We conduct an extensive experimental analysis, testing 7 ML models on 5 large datasets comprising over 37 million flows. Our results clearly demonstrate that adding TTP-based features for training the models robustly improves their performance. Our models outperform the standard ones 922 times out of a total of 952, (i.e., 96.8% of the time), with the biggest improvements (up to 84.9% in terms of FPR) being observed in situations designed to be challenging for ML models.
PDF DOIYashovardhan Sharma, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2023 European Interdisciplinary Cybersecurity Conference. 2023.
Abstract:Network analysis and machine learning techniques have been widely applied for building malware detection systems. Though these systems attain impressive results, they often are (i) not extensible, being monolithic, well tuned for the specific task they have been designed for but very difficult to adapt and/or extend to other settings, and (ii) not interpretable, being black boxes whose inner complexity makes it impossible to link the result of detection with its root cause, making further analysis of threats a challenge. In this paper we present RADAR, an extensible and explainable system that exploits the popular TTP (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) ontology of adversary behaviour described in the industry-standard MITRE ATT&CK framework in order to unequivocally identify and classify malicious behaviour using network traffic. We evaluate RADAR on a very large dataset comprising of 2,286,907 malicious and benign samples, representing a total of 84,792,452 network flows. The experimental analysis confirms that the proposed methodology can be effectively exploited: RADAR’s ability to detect malware is comparable to other state-of-the-art non-interpretable systems’ capabilities. To the best of our knowledge, RADAR is the first TTP-based system for malware detection that uses machine learning while being extensible and explainable.
PDF DOIJack Sturgess, Sebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. Inaugural Symposium on Vehicle Security and Privacy (VehicleSec 2023). 2023.
Abstract:Electric vehicle charging sessions can be authorised in different ways, ranging from smartphone applications to smart cards with unique identifiers that link the electric vehicle to the charging station.However, these methods do not provide strong authentication guarantees.In this paper, we propose a novel second factor authentication scheme to tackle this problem.We show that by using inertial sensor data collected from IMU sensors either embedded in the handle of the charging cable or on a separate smartwatch, users can be authenticated implicitly by behavioural biometrics as they unhook the cable from the charging station and plug it into their car at the start of a charging session.To validate the system, we conducted a user study (n=20) to collect data and we developed a suite of authentication models for which we achieve EERs of 0.06.
PDF Publication DOISebastian Köhler, Richard Baker, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
In Proc. Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium 2023. 2023.
Abstract:We present a novel attack against the Combined Charging System, one of the most widely used DC rapid charging technologies for electric vehicles (EVs).Our attack, BROKEN-WIRE, interrupts necessary control communication between the vehicle and charger, causing charging sessions to abort.The attack requires only temporary physical proximity and can be conducted wirelessly from a distance, allowing individual vehicles or entire fleets to be disrupted stealthily and simultaneously.In addition, it can be mounted with off-the-shelf radio hardware and minimal technical knowledge.By exploiting CSMA/CA behavior, only a very weak signal needs to be induced into the victim to disrupt communication -exceeding the effectiveness of broadband noise jamming by three orders of magnitude.The exploited behavior is a required part of the HomePlug Green PHY, DIN 70121 & ISO 15118 standards and all known implementations exhibit it.We first study the attack in a controlled testbed and then demonstrate it against eight vehicles and 20 chargers in real deployments.We find the attack to be successful in the real world, at ranges up to 47 m, for a power budget of less than 1 W. We further show that the attack can work between the floors of a building (e.g., multi-story parking), through perimeter fences, and from 'drive-by' attacks.We present a heuristic model to estimate the number of vehicles that can be attacked simultaneously for a given output power.BROKENWIRE has immediate implications for a substantial proportion of the around 12 million battery EVs on the roads worldwide -and profound effects on the new wave of electrification for vehicle fleets, both for private enterprise and crucial public services, as well as electric buses, trucks and small ships.As such, we conducted a disclosure to the industry and discussed a range of mitigation techniques that could be deployed to limit the impact.
PDF Publication DOIGeorg Baselt, Martin Strohmeier, James Pavur, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Cyber Conflict (CYCON), 2022 14th International Conference on. May 2022.
Abstract:Modern aviation systems increasingly use satellite channels for data communication. However, many SATCOM providers do not offer encryption below the application layer by default, making their services vulnerable to eavesdroppers and creating security concerns. This research analyses such vulnerabilities specifically with regard to the aviation domain. We show that even low-resourced attackers can exploit this lack of security. We capture a broad range of SATCOM transmissions in the Ku-Band frequencies using a TV Tuner Card and widely available low-budget equipment for under 400 US dollars. Over 370 GB of aviation-related satellite-downstream data from high-throughput satellites were analysed from a measurement site in Central Europe. The results of this campaign reveal both security and privacy concerns across the whole spectrum of the industry. We identify unencrypted SATCOM usage comprising usage from in-flight entertainment systems to leaked private encrypted keys. Furthermore, we identified 328 specific aircraft broadcasting their live operations, including three government aircraft that actively blocked any information on their flights from air-traffic tracking sites. This work concludes with recommendations for both satellite service providers and aviation stakeholders on how these issues could be solved by using encryption at different network layers.
PDF DOIMartin Georgiev, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
In Proc. 21st Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2022). 2022.
Abstract:The study aims to understand and quantify the privacy threat landscape of touch-based biometrics. Touch interactions from mobile devices are ubiquitous and do not require additional permissions to collect. Two privacy threats were examined - user tracking and personal information leakage. First, we designed a practical fingerprinting simulation experiment and executed it on a large publicly available touch interactions dataset. We found that touch-based strokes can be used to fingerprint users with high accuracy and performance can be further increased by adding only a single extra feature. The system can distinguish between new and returning users with up to 75% accuracy and match a new session to the user it originated from with up to 74% accuracy. In the second part of the study, we investigated the possibility of predicting personal information attributes through the use of touch interaction behavior. The attributes we investigated were age, gender, dominant hand, country of origin, height, and weight. We found that our model can predict the age group and gender of users with up to 66% and 62% accuracy respectively. Finally, we discuss countermeasures, limitations and provide suggestions for future work in the field.
PDF Publication DOIFrederick Barr-Smith, Richard Baker, Tim Blazytko, Ivan Martinovic.
In Proc. ACM Workshop on Software Supply Chain Offensive Research and Ecosystem Defenses (SCORED '22). 2022.
Abstract:The insertion of trojanised binaries into supply chains are a particularly subtle form of cyber-attack that require a multi-staged and complex deployment methodology to implement and execute. In the years preceding this research there has been a spike in closedsource software supply chain attacks used to attack downstream clients or users of a company. To detect this attack type, we present an approach to detecting the insertion of malicious functionality in supply chains via differential analysis of binaries. This approach determines whether malicious functionality has been inserted in a particular build by looking for indicators of maliciousness. We accomplish this via automated comparison of a known benign build to successive potentially malicious versions. To substantiate this approach we present a system, Exorcist, that we have designed, developed and evaluated as capable of detecting trojanised binaries in Windows software supply chains. In evaluating this system we analyse 12 samples from high-profile APT attacks conducted via the software supply chain.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Georgiev, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
In Proc. 17th International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2022). 2022.
Abstract:The field of continuous touch-based authentication has been rapidly developing over the last decade, creating a fragmented and difficult-to-navigate area for researchers and application developers alike. In this study, we perform a systematic literature analysis of 30 studies on the techniques used for feature extraction, classification, and aggregation in continuous touch-based authentication systems as well as the performance metrics reported by each study. Based on our findings, we design a set of experiments to compare the performance of the most frequently used techniques in the field under clearly defined conditions. In addition, we introduce two new techniques for continuous touch-based authentication: an expanded feature set (consisting of 149 unique features) and a multi-algorithm ensemble-based classifier. The comparison includes 13 feature sets, 11 classifiers, and 5 aggregation methods. In total, 204 model configurations are examined and we show that our novel techniques outperform the current state-of-the-art in each category. The results are also validated across three different publicly available datasets. Our best performing model achieves 4.8% EER using 16 consecutive strokes. Finally, we discuss the findings of our investigation with the aim of making the field more understandable and accessible for researchers and practitioners.
PDF Publication DOISebastian Köhler, Simon Birnbach, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. Workshop Cybersecurity of Electric Vehicle Charging and Smart Grid Resources (SECEVC). 2022.
Abstract:The adoption of fully Electric Vehicles (EVs) is happening at a rapid pace. To make the charging as fast and convenient as possible, new charging approaches are developed constantly. One such approach is wireless charging, also known as Wireless Power Transfer (WPT). Instead of charging an EV via a charging cable, the battery is charged wirelessly. For safety and efficiency reasons, the vehicle and the charging station continuously exchange critical information about the charging process. This includes, e.g., the maximum voltage and current, battery temperature, and State of Charge (SoC). Since there is no physical connection between the vehicle and the charging station, this necessary control communication has to be implemented as a wireless connection. However, if the communication is interrupted, the charging process is aborted for safety reasons. In this paper, we analyze the attack surface of EV charging standards that use such a wireless control communication. More specifically, we discuss potential wireless attacks that can violate the availability and analyze the implemented security features of a real-world wireless charging station that has already been deployed. We found that the tested charging station does not implement even simple security measures, such as IEEE 802.11w, that can protect the communication from denial-ofservice attacks. Finally, we discuss potential countermeasures, and give recommendations to improve the security and increase the resilience of wireless charging.
PDF Publication DOIJack Sturgess, Simon Eberz, Ivo Sluganovic, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 7th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). 2022.
Abstract:In this paper, we show that the tap gesture, performed when a user ‘taps’ a smartwatch onto an NFC-enabled terminal to make a payment, is a biometric capable of implicitly authenticating the user and simultaneously recognising intent-to-pay. The proposed system can be deployed purely in software on the watch without requiring updates to payment terminals. It is agnostic to terminal type and position and the intent recognition portion does not require any training data from the user. To validate the system, we conduct a user study (n=16) to collect wrist motion data from users as they interact with payment terminals and to collect long-term data from a subset of them ($\mathrm{n}=9$) as they perform daily activities. Based on this data, we identify optimum gesture parameters and develop authentication and intent recognition models, for which we achieve EERs of 0.08 and 0.04, respectively.
PDF DOIJack Sturgess, Simon Eberz, Ivo Sluganovic, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 7th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). 2022.
Abstract:In this paper, we show that the tap gesture, performed when a user ‘taps’ a smartwatch onto an NFC-enabled terminal to make a payment, is a biometric capable of implicitly authenticating the user and simultaneously recognising intent-to-pay. The proposed system can be deployed purely in software on the watch without requiring updates to payment terminals. It is agnostic to terminal type and position and the intent recognition portion does not require any training data from the user. To validate the system, we conduct a user study (n=16) to collect wrist motion data from users as they interact with payment terminals and to collect long-term data from a subset of them (n=9) as they perform daily activities. Based on this data, we identify optimum gesture parameters and develop authentication and intent recognition models, for which we achieve EERs of 0.08 and 0.04, respectively.
PDF Publication DOIKlaudia Krawiecka, Simon Birnbach, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. IEEE Workshop on the Internet of Safe Things: SafeThings 2022. 2022.
Abstract:Attributing interactions with Internet of Things (IoT) devices to specific users in smart environments is extremely important as it enables personalized configurations and access control. This requirement is particularly stringent when it comes to parental control measures designed to protect children from contact with dangerous machinery or viewing materials that are inappropriate for their age. To this end, we show that naturally occurring interactions with objects in smart environments can be used as a behavioral biometric in order to identify users. The heterogeneous nature of smart devices enables the collection of a wide variety of inputs from such interactions. In addition, this system model allows for seamless identification, without the need for active user participation or rearrangement of the IoT devices. We conduct a remote study taking place in six households composed of 25 participants. We demonstrate that our system can identify users in multi-user environments with an average accuracy of at least 91% for a single object interaction without requiring any sensors on the object itself. This accuracy rises to 100% when six or more consecutive interactions are considered.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Georgiev, Simon Eberz, Henry Turner, Giulio Lovisotto, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 2022 ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2022). 2022.
Abstract:In this paper, we investigate common pitfalls affecting the evaluation of authentication systems based on touch dynamics. We consider different factors that lead to misrepresented performance, are incompatible with stated system and threat models or impede reproducibility and comparability with previous work. Specifically, we investigate the effects of (i) small sample sizes (both number of users and recording sessions), (ii) using different phone models in training data, (iii) selecting non-contiguous training data, (iv) inserting attacker samples in training data and (v) swipe aggregation. We perform a systematic review of 30 touch dynamics papers showing that all of them overlook at least one of these pitfalls. To quantify each pitfall's effect, we design a set of experiments and collect a new longitudinal dataset of touch dynamics from 470 users over 31 days comprised of 1,166,092 unique swipes. We make this dataset and our code available online. Our results show significant percentage-point changes in reported mean EER for several pitfalls: including attacker data (2.55%), non-contiguous training data (3.8%), phone model mixing (3.2%-5.8%). We show that, in a common evaluation setting, cumulative effects of these evaluation choices result in a combined difference of 8.9% EER. We also largely observe these effects across the entire ROC curve. Furthermore, we validate the pitfalls on four distinct classifiers - SVM, Random Forest, Neural Network, and kNN. Based on these insights, we propose a set of best practices that, if followed, will lead to more realistic and comparable reporting of results in the field.
PDF Publication DOIBushra AlAhmadi, Louise Axon, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 31st USENIX Security Symposium. 2022.
Abstract:In this work, we focus on the prevalence of False Positive (FP) alarms produced by security tools, and Security Operation Centers (SOCs) practitioners' perception of their quality. In an online survey we conducted with security practitioners (n = 20) working in SOCs, practitioners confirmed the high FP rates of the tools used, requiring manual validation. With these findings in mind, we conducted a broader, discovery-orientated, qualitative investigation with security practitioners (n = 21) of the limitations of security tools, particularly their alarms' quality and validity. Our results highlight that, despite the perceived volume of FPs, most are attributed to benign triggers---true alarms, explained by legitimate behavior in the organization's environment, which analysts may choose to ignore. To properly evaluate security tools' adequacy and performance, it is critical that vendors and researchers are able make such distinctions between types of FP. Alarm validation is a tedious task that can cause alarm burnout and eventually desensitization. Therefore, we investigated the process of alarm validation in SOCs, identifying factors that may influence the outcome of this process. To improve security alarm quality, we elicit five properties (Reliable, Explainable, Analytical, Contextual, Transferable) required to foster effective and quick validation of alarms. Incorporating these requirements in future tools will not only reduce alarm burnout but improve SOC analysts' decision-making process by generating interpretable and meaningful alarms that enable prompt reaction.
PDF PublicationSebastian Kohler, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 2022 ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2022). 2022.
Abstract:Since cameras have become a crucial part in many safety-critical systems and applications, such as autonomous vehicles and surveillance, a large body of academic and non-academic work has shown attacks against their main component — the image sensor. However, these attacks are limited to coarse-grained and often suspicious injections because light is used as an attack vector. Furthermore, due to the nature of optical attacks, they require the line-of-sight between the adversary and the target camera. In this paper, we present a novel post-transducer signal injection attack against CCD image sensors, as they are used in professional, scientific, and even military settings. We show how electromagnetic emanation can be used to manipulate the image information captured by a CCD image sensor with the granularity down to the brightness of individual pixels. We study the feasibility of our attack and then demonstrate its effects in the scenario of automatic barcode scanning. Our results indicate that the injected distortion can disrupt automated vision-based intelligent systems.
PDF PublicationJack Sturgess, Simon Eberz, Ivo Sluganovic, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. WristSense 2022: Workshop on Sensing Systems and Applications Using Wrist Worn Smart Devices. 2022.
Abstract:In this paper, we show that as a user makes mobile payments with a smartwatch, the height of the user can be inferred purely from inertial sensor data captured on the watch (with R2 scores of up to 0.77). Besides unwanted information exposure, we also show that users of a similar height are more difficult to distinguish between in terms of their tap gesture data and that an attacker who chooses a victim of a similar height can improve the success chance of impersonation (by increasing the false acceptance rate by up to 20.6%).
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
ACM Transactions on Intelligent Systems and Technology (TIST). December 2021.
Abstract:In recent years, air traffic communication data has become easy to access, enabling novel research in many fields. Exploiting this new data source, a wide range of applications have emerged, from weather forecasting to stock market prediction, or the collection of intelligence about military and government movements. Typically, these applications require knowledge about the metadata of the aircraft, specifically its operator and the aircraft category. armasuisse Science + Technology, the R&D agency for the Swiss Armed Forces, has been developing Classi-Fly, a novel approach to obtain metadata about aircraft based on their movement patterns. We validate Classi-Fly using several hundred thousand flights collected through open source means, in conjunction with ground truth from publicly available aircraft registries containing more than 2 million aircraft. We show that we can obtain the correct aircraft category with an accuracy of greater than 88%. In cases, where no metadata is available, this approach can be used to create the data necessary for applications working with air traffic communication. Finally, we show that it is feasible to automatically detect particular sensitive aircraft such as police and surveillance aircraft using this method.
PDF Publication DOIJunzi Sun, Xavier Olive, Martin Strohmeier, Matthias Schäfer, Ivan Martinovic, Vincent Lenders.
2021 IEEE/AIAA 40th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). October 2021.
Abstract:The year 2020 had been selected by EU and US regulators as the deadline for ADS-B compliant Mode S transponders, following various iterations of ADS-B and Mode S services. It will also be remembered as marking a profound change in civil aviation, when the global virus outbreak triggered an unprecedented slowdown in traffic and brought immense impact on the world economy. Fleets have been grounded and a great number of airplanes went into long-term storage due to travel restrictions. The OpenSky Network has been collecting valuable information regarding ADS-B compliance since 2017. It also acted as an important open data source for studying the aviation industry during these crisis times. In this paper, we analyze years of data collected by the OpenSky Network to provide an overview of the past and current situations in global air traffic with equipage updates, ADS-B implementation, Mode S interrogation practices, and fleet management by airlines.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Strohmeier, James Pavur, Ivan Martinovic, Vincent Lenders.
International Conference on Critical Information Infrastructures Security. September 2021.
Abstract:Neutrality has long played a central role in the political and strategic stances of many small states. The impact of neutrality on matters of national security and sovereignty have thus been subject to significant academic interest. With the recent emergence of cyber as a fifth dimension of interstate competition, the impact of permanent state neutrality in this domain has not yet been well characterized. We examine the reality of this concept using countries with a long-standing history and tradition of neutrality in matters of warfare and foreign policy. A theoretical analysis of the complexities of neutrality and cyber-crime is used to motivate a novel data-driven experimental assessment of real-world outcomes for neutral states. This experimental study leverages low-interaction honeypots distributed across 13 countries. Delving into more than 1.5 billion network sessions made from these honeypots over an 80-day period reveals more than one million malicious attacks originating from information systems in 177 different countries. Through statistical analysis of these attacks, we find little evidence that low-sophistication adversaries target their attacks with consideration of victim location or state neutrality. Beyond the immediate implications of these findings, we believe the method presented in this paper represents a unique data-driven approach to comparative international study of cyber-neutrality and the global dynamics of cyber-security more broadly.
PDF Publication DOIGiulio Lovisotto, Henry Turner, Ivo Sluganovic, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic.
30th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 21). August 2021.
Abstract:Whilst significant research effort into adversarial examples (AE) has emerged in recent years, the main vector to realize these attacks in the real-world currently relies on static adversarial patches, which are limited in their conspicuousness and can not be modified once deployed. In this paper, we propose Short-Lived Adversarial Perturbations (SLAP), a novel technique that allows adversaries to realize robust, dynamic real-world AE from a distance. As we show in this paper, such attacks can be achieved using a light projector to shine a specifically crafted adversarial image in order to perturb real-world objects and transform them into AE. This allows the adversary greater control over the attack compared to adversarial patches: (i) projections can be dynamically turned on and off or modified at will, (ii) projections do not suffer from the locality constraint imposed by patches, making them harder to detect. We study the feasibility of SLAP in the self-driving scenario, targeting both object detector and traffic sign recognition tasks. We demonstrate that the proposed method generates AE that are robust to different environmental conditions for several networks and lighting conditions: we successfully cause misclassifications of state-of-the-art networks such as Yolov3 and Mask-RCNN with up to 98% success rate for a variety of angles and distances. Additionally, we demonstrate that AE generated with SLAP can bypass SentiNet, a recent AE detection method which relies on the fact that adversarial patches generate highly salient and localized areas in the input images.
PDF PublicationJoshua Smailes, Daniel Moser, Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 7th ACM Cyber-Physical System Security Workshop (CPSS 2021). June 2021.
Abstract:Worldwide, voice-based Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications are gradually being replaced with data link-based equivalents, namely the Controller Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC) system. This helps to manage the high levels of congestion on voice-based ATC---under modern traffic levels these analog voice channels are extremely busy, especially at times of peak traffic. CPDLC offers the ability to conduct most ATC actions in the form of digital text-based messages. As with voice-based ATC, CPDLC has no built-in security mechanisms. Furthermore, the links which carry CPDLC do not have security mechanisms either. In this paper, we analyze the susceptibility of CPDLC to attacks by a software-defined radio (SDR)-equipped attacker. Crucially, this is different to attacks on aviation surveillance systems, as it requires the attacker to comply with a larger authentication protocol. We identify attacks on CPDLC, including a man-in-the-middle attack on the protocol. This attack enables a take-over of an aircraft's communication on an attacker-specified frequency, after which arbitrary CPDLC commands can be transmitted to the target without alerting the legitimate controller. We empirically assess the likely effectiveness of this attack through a data collection and analysis exercise. In order to counteract this type of attack, we propose three countermeasures of different complexities, including logical checks and a public key infrastructure approach. We also estimate to what extent these countermeasures can be implemented without altering the underlying protocol.
PDF DOIJames Pavur, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
13th International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon). May 2021.
Abstract:Launch vehicle “ridesharing” has redefined access to and use of outer space. Today, rockets carry satellites from dozens of countries on shared journeys towards the stars. To ensure that these diverse payloads pose no threat to the overall space mission, safety controls have emerged to protect against mechanical and electrical failure. While these protections were designed to mitigate the risk of probabilistic physical effects, they also have implications for cyber attackers seeking to abuse the trusted status of secondary payloads to harm launch missions. This paper considers such dynamics through a multidisciplinary lens. It begins by drawing on the perspective of security studies and international relations to characterize what motivates an attacker to target satellite launches. This is combined with a technical analysis which leverages model-based engineering techniques to assess the threat of electronic warfare (EW) and radio frequency interference (RFI) attacks against missile range safety technologies on modern launch vehicles. Through dynamic physical simulation, we demonstrate that even inexpensive nanosatellite platforms have the potential to threaten shared launch vehicles in the hands of motivated cyber adversaries. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of these findings for both policymakers and technical researchers interested in cyber-physical threats in orbit.
PDF Publication DOIJames Pavur, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). February 2021.
Abstract:—Satellite broadband services are critical infrastructures, bringing connectivity to the most remote regions of the globe. However, due to performance concerns, many geostation-ary satellite broadband services are unencrypted and vulnerable to long-range eavesdropping attacks. This paper delves into the underlying cause of these issues, presenting the case that the widespread use of Performance Enhancing Proxies (PEPs) for TCP optimization has created a security/performance trade-off. A review of previous mitigation proposals finds limited real-world adoption due to a variety of factors ranging from misaligned commercial incentives to the prevalence of unverified “black-box” encryption products. To address these shortcomings, we design and implement a fully open-source and encrypted-by-default PEP/VPN hybrid, called QPEP. Built around the QUIC standard, QPEP enables individuals to encrypt satellite traffic without ISP involvement. Additionally, we present an open and replicable Docker-based testbed for benchmarking QPEP, and other PEP applications, through simulation. These experiments show that QPEP enables satellite customers to encrypt their TCP traffic with up to 72% faster page load times (PLTs) compared to traditional VPN encryption. Even relative to other unencrypted PEPs, QPEP offers up to 54% faster PLTs while also protecting communications in transit. We briefly discuss how QPEP might leverage bespoke modifications to the QUIC protocol for further optimization. Ultimately, our experiments suggest that QPEP’s hybrid architecture represents a promising new technique for bringing both security and performance to satellite broadband while avoiding costly alterations to status-quo networks.
PDF Video Publication DOIJames Pavur, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 16th ACM ASIA Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM ASIACCS 2021). 2021.
Abstract:Space Situational Awareness (SSA) data is critical to the safe piloting of satellites through an ever-growing field of orbital debris. However, measurement complexity means that most satellite operators cannot independently acquire SSA data and must rely on a handful of centralized repositories operated by major space powers. As interstate competition in orbit increases, so does the threat of attacks abusing these information-sharing relationships. This paper offers one of the first considerations of defense techniques against SSA deceptions. Building on historical precedent and real-world SSA data, we simulate an attack whereby an SSA operator seeks to disguise spy satellites as pieces of debris. We further develop and evaluate a machine-learning based anomaly detection tool which allows defenders to detect 90-98% of deception attempts with little to no in-house astrometry hardware. Beyond the direct contribution of this system, the paper takes a unique interdisciplinary approach, drawing connections between cyber-security, astrophysics, and international security studies. It presents the general case that systems security methods can tackle many novel and complex problems in an historically neglected domain and provides methods and techniques for doing so.
PDF Publication DOISimon Birnbach, Richard Baker, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. 2021.
Abstract:Drones are becoming increasingly popular for hobbyists and recreational use. But with this surge in popularity comes increased risk to privacy as the technology makes it easy to spy on people in otherwise-private environments, such as an individual’s home. An attacker can fly a drone over fences and walls to observe the inside of a house, without having physical access. Existing drone detection systems require specialist hardware and expensive deployment efforts, making them inaccessible to the general public. In this work, we present a drone detection system that requires minimal prior configuration and uses inexpensive commercial off-the-shelf hardware to detect drones that are carrying out privacy invasion attacks. We use a model of the attack structure to derive statistical metrics for movement and proximity that are then applied to received communications between a drone and its controller. We test our system in real-world experiments with two popular consumer drone models mounting privacy invasion attacks using a range of flight patterns. We are able both to detect the presence of a drone and to identify which phase of the privacy attack was in progress while being resistant to false positives from other mobile transmitters. For line-of-sight approaches using our kurtosis-based method, we are able to detect all drones at a distance of 6 m, with the majority of approaches detected at 25 m or farther from the target window without suffering false positives for stationary or mobile non-drone transmitters.
PDF Publication DOIKlaudia Krawiecka, Jack Sturgess, Alina Petrova, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. 2021 European Symposium on Usable Security (EuroUSEC 2021). 2021.
Abstract:Remote experiments with human participants play an important role across multiple fields of studies, from medical science to engineering, as they allow for better representation of human participants and more realistic experimental environments, and ensure research continuity in exceptional circumstances, such as nationwide lockdowns. Yet cyber security has few standards for conducting experiments with human participants, let alone in a remote setting. In this paper, we introduce an end-to-end framework for remote experimentation in cyber security. This framework systematises design and deployment practices while preserving realistic, reproducible data collection and the safety and privacy of participants. We evaluate our framework using a case study involving Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices deployed at remote locations and analyse the experience from the perspectives of both the researchers and the participants.
PDF Publication DOISebastian Köhler, Giulio Lovisotto, Simon Birnbach, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
Proc. Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2021). 2021.
Abstract:In this paper, we describe how the electronic rolling shutter in CMOS image sensors can be exploited using a bright, modulated light source (e.g., an inexpensive, off-the-shelf laser), to inject fine-grained image disruptions. We demonstrate the attack on seven different CMOS cameras, ranging from cheap IoT to semi-professional surveillance cameras, to highlight the wide applicability of the rolling shutter attack. We model the fundamental factors affecting a rolling shutter attack in an uncontrolled setting. We then perform an exhaustive evaluation of the attack’s effect on the task of object detection, investigating the effect of attack parameters. We validate our model against empirical data collected on two separate cameras, showing that by simply using information from the camera’s datasheet the adversary can accurately predict the injected distortion size and optimize their attack accordingly. We find that an adversary can hide up to 75% of objects perceived by state-of-the-art detectors by selecting appropriate attack parameters. We also investigate the stealthiness of the attack in comparison to a naïve camera blinding attack, showing that common image distortion metrics can not detect the attack presence. Therefore, we present a new, accurate and lightweight enhancement to the backbone network of an object detector to recognize rolling shutter attacks. Overall, our results indicate that rolling shutter attacks can substantially reduce the performance and reliability of vision-based intelligent systems.
PDF Publication DOISimon Birnbach, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
ACM Transactions on Internet of Things. 2021.
Abstract:In this article, we verify physical events using data from an ensemble of smart home sensors. This approach both protects against event sensor faults and sophisticated attackers. To validate our system’s performance, we set up a “smart home” in an office environment. We recognize 22 event types using 48 sensors over the course of two weeks. Using data from the physical sensors, we verify the event stream supplied by the event sensors to detect both masking and spoofing attacks. We consider three threat models: a zero-effort attacker, an opportunistic attacker, and a sensor-compromise attacker who can arbitrarily modify live sensor data. For spoofed events, we achieve perfect classification for 9 out of 22 events and achieve a 0% false alarm rate at a detection rate exceeding 99.9% for 15 events. For 11 events the majority of masking attacks can be detected without causing any false alarms. We also show that even a strong opportunistic attacker is inherently limited to spoofing few select events and that doing so involves lengthy waiting periods. Finally, we demonstrate the vulnerability of a single-classifier system to compromised sensor data and introduce a more secure approach based on sensor fusion.
PDF Publication DOIHenry Turner, Giulio Lovisotto, Ivan Martinovic.
Computer Speech and Language 72. 2021.
Abstract:Speaker anonymization methods are a growing research area, due to the common use of voice interfaces coupled with growing privacy requirements. However, existing systems suffer from several issues, in particular a reduction in the entropy space of the newly created voices. This is problematic as it reduces the diversity of the produced anonymous voices, thus making distinguishing between anonymized voices more difficult, and limiting the number of anonymous voices that can be generated. In this work we propose a method for creating the new identity component for anonymized voices, termed an x-vector, which aims to better reflect the natural diversity of voices, in turn increasing the diversity of the voices of anonymized speakers. We combine this identity generation method with existing anonymization schemes, to produce an overall anonymization system, which we evaluate. Our results demonstrate that our scheme creates more diverse anonymized voices than the existing baseline method. Furthermore, our results show that the assumption of perfect de-coupling between identity and non-identity voice components used in existing speaker anonymization frameworks does not hold, highlighting a clear avenue for future work.
PDF Publication DOIMichal Piskozub, Fabio De Gaspari, Freddie Barr-Smith, Luigi Mancini, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 16th ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2021.
Abstract:Economic incentives encourage malware authors to constantly develop new, increasingly complex malware to steal sensitive data or blackmail individuals and companies into paying large ransoms. In 2017, the worldwide economic impact of cyberattacks is estimated to be between 445 and 600 billion USD, or 0.8% of global GDP. Traditionally, one of the approaches used to defend against malware is network traffic analysis, which relies on network data to detect the presence of potentially malicious software. However, to keep up with increasing network speeds and amount of traffic, network analysis is generally limited to work on aggregated network data, which is traditionally challenging and yields mixed results. In this paper we present MalPhase, a system that was designed to cope with the limitations of aggregated flows. MalPhase features a multi-phase pipeline for malware detection, type and family classification. The use of an extended set of network flow features and a simultaneous multi-tier architecture facilitates a performance improvement for deep learning models, making them able to detect malicious flows (>98% F1) and categorize them to a respective malware type (>93% F1) and family (>91% F1). Furthermore, the use of robust features and denoising autoencoders allows MalPhase to perform well on samples with varying amounts of benign traffic mixed in. Finally, MalPhase detects unseen malware samples with performance comparable to that of known samples, even when interlaced with benign flows to reflect realistic network environments.
PDF DOIFrederick Barr-Smith, Xabier Ugarte-Pedrero, Mariano Graziano, Riccardo Spolaor, Ivan Martinovic.
2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 2021.
Abstract:As malware detection algorithms and methods become more sophisticated, malware authors adopt equally sophisticated evasion mechanisms to defeat them. Anecdotal evidence claims Living-Off-The-Land (LotL) techniques are one of the major evasion techniques used in many malware attacks. These techniques leverage binaries already present in the system to conduct malicious actions. We present the first large-scale systematic investigation of the use of these techniques by malware on Windows systems.In this paper, we analyse how common the use of these native system binaries is across several malware datasets, containing a total of 31,805,549 samples. We identify an average 9.41% prevalence. Our results show that the use of LotL techniques is prolific, particularly in Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) malware samples where the prevalence is 26.26%, over twice that of commodity malware.To illustrate the evasive potential of LotL techniques, we test the usage of LotL techniques against several fully patched Windows systems in a local sandboxed environment and show that there is a generalised detection gap in 10 of the most popular anti-virus products.
PDF Video Github DOIGiulio Lovisotto, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
2020 IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P). September 2020.
Abstract:In this work, we investigate the concept of biometric backdoors: a template poisoning attack on biometric systems that allows adversaries to stealthily and effortlessly impersonate users in the long-term by exploiting the template update procedure. We show that such attacks can be carried out even by attackers with physical limitations (no digital access to the sensor) and zero knowledge of training data (they know neither decision boundaries nor user template). Based on the adversaries' own templates, they craft several intermediate samples that incrementally bridge the distance between their own template and the legitimate user's. As these adversarial samples are added to the template, the attacker is eventually accepted alongside the legitimate user. To avoid detection, we design the attack to minimize the number of rejected samples. We design our method to cope with weak assumptions for the attacker and we evaluate the effectiveness of this approach on state-of-the-art face recognition pipelines based on deep neural networks. We find that in white-box scenarios, adversaries can successfully carry out the attack in over 70 % of cases with less than ten injection attempts. Even in black-box scenarios, we find that exploiting the transferability of adversarial samples from surrogate models can lead to successful attacks in around 15 % of cases. Finally, we design a poisoning detection technique that leverages the consistent directionality of template updates in feature space to discriminate between legitimate and malicious updates. We evaluate such a countermeasure with a set of intra-user variability factors which may present the same directionality characteristics, obtaining equal error rates for the detection between 7-14% and leading to over 99% of attacks being detected after only two sample injections. We design our method to cope with weak assumptions for the attacker and we evaluate the effectiveness of this approach on state-of-the-art face recognition pipelines based on deep neural networks. We find that in white-box scenarios, adversaries can successfully carry out the attack in over 70 % of cases with less than ten injection attempts. Even in black-box scenarios, we find that exploiting the transferability of adversarial samples from surrogate models can lead to successful attacks in around 15 % of cases. Finally, we design a poisoning detection technique that leverages the consistent directionality of template updates in feature space to discriminate between legitimate and malicious updates. We evaluate such a countermeasure with a set of intra-user variability factors which may present the same directionality characteristics, obtaining equal error rates for the detection between 7-14% and leading to over 99% of attacks being detected after only two sample injections.
PDF Video Publication DOIGiulio Lovisotto, Henry Turner, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE 15th Computer Society Workshop on Biometrics. June 2020.
Abstract:In this paper, we propose a system that enables photoplethysmogram (PPG)-based authentication by using a smartphone camera. PPG signals are obtained by recording a video from the camera as users are resting their finger on top of the camera lens. The signals can be extracted based on subtle changes in the video that are due to changes in the light reflection properties of the skin as the blood flows through the finger. We collect a dataset of PPG measurements from a set of 15 users over the course of 6-11 sessions per user using an iPhone X for the measurements. We design an authentication pipeline that leverages the uniqueness of each individual’s cardiovascular system, identifying a set of distinctive features from each heartbeat. We conduct a set of experiments to evaluate the recognition performance of the PPG biometric trait, including cross-session scenarios which have been disregarded in previous work. We found that when aggregating sufficient samples for the decision we achieve an EER as low as 8%, but that the performance greatly decreases in the cross-session scenario, with an average EER of 20%.
PDF Publication DOIJames Pavur, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
2020 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P). May 2020.
Abstract:Very Small Aperture Terminals (VSAT) have revolutionized maritime operations. However, the security dimensions of maritime VSAT services are not well understood. Historically, high equipment costs have acted as a barrier to entry for both researchers and attackers. In this paper we demonstrate a substantial change in threat model, proving practical attacks against maritime VSAT networks with less than $400 of widely-available television equipment. This is achieved through GSExtract, a purpose-built forensic tool which enables the extraction of IP traffic from highly corrupted VSAT data streams.The implications of this threat are assessed experimentally through the analysis of more than 1.3 TB of real-world maritime VSAT recordings encompassing 26 million square kilometers of coverage area. The underlying network platform employed in these systems is representative of more than 60% of the global maritime VSAT services market. We find that sensitive data belonging to some of the world's largest maritime companies is regularly leaked over VSAT ship-to-shore communications. This threat is contextualized through illustrative case studies ranging from the interception and alteration of navigational charts to theft of passport and credit card details. Beyond this, we demonstrate the ability to arbitrarily intercept and modify TCP sessions under certain network configurations, enabling man-in-the-middle and denial of service attacks against ships at sea. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the unique requirements and challenges for encryption in VSAT environments.
PDF Publication DOIMatthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Jon Harman, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). February 2020.
Abstract:—Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios readily available, a novel threat has emerged which allows a wide range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, predicting their ultimate effect is difficult. A major factor in this effect is how flight crew respond, especially whether their extensive training in fault handling helps them to manage attacks. To investigate this we conducted a user study, inviting 30 Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We use wireless attacks on three safety-related systems, based on existing literature: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS). To analyze their response, we collected control input data coupled with closed and open interview responses. We found that all three attack scenarios created significant control impact and disruption through missed approaches, avoidance maneuvers and diversions. They further increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and for each attack, at least a third of our participants switched off the system entirely—even if they were important safety systems. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be valuable.
PDF Video Publication DOIMatthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
arXiv preprint arXiv:2010.01034. 2020.
Abstract:Airborne collision avoidance systems provide an onboard safety net should normal air traffic control procedures fail to keep aircraft separated. These systems are widely deployed and have been constantly refined over the past three decades, usually in response to near misses or mid-air collisions. Recent years have seen security research increasingly focus on aviation, identifying that key wireless links---some of which are used in collision avoidance---are vulnerable to attack. In this paper, we go one step further to understand whether an attacker can remotely trigger false collision avoidance alarms. Primarily considering the next-generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), we adopt a modelling approach to extract attacker constraints from technical standards before simulating collision avoidance attacks against standardized ACAS X code. We find that in 44% of cases, an attacker can successfully trigger a collision avoidance alert which on average results in a 590 ft altitude deviation; when the aircraft is at lower altitudes, this success rate rises considerably to 79%. Furthermore, we show how our simulation approach can be used to help defend against attacks by identifying where attackers are most likely to be successful.
PDF PublicationMatthias Schäfer, Xavier Olive, Martin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Ivan Martinovic, Vincent Lenders.
2019 IEEE/AIAA 38th Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC). September 2019.
Abstract:Collision avoidance is one of the most crucial applications with regards to the safety of the global airspace. The introduction of mandatory airborne collision avoidance systems has significantly reduced the likelihood of mid-air collisions despite the increase in air traffic density. In this paper, we analyze 250 billion aircraft transponder messages received from 126,700 aircraft by the OpenSky Network over a two-week period. We use this data to quantify equipage and usage aspects of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) as it is working in the real world. We furthermore provide an overview of the methods used by OpenSky to collect, decode and store this data for use by other researchers and aviation authorities. We observe that around 89.5% of the ADS-B-equipped aircraft have an operational TCAS. We further analyze the concrete usage of TCAS by examining several case studies where a loss of separation between aircraft has happened.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Strohmeier, Daniel Moser, Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE Communications Magazine. September 2019.
Abstract:As air traffic control communication moves toward digital systems, there is an emerging trend toward supplementing or even fully substituting the traditional air-ground link in favor of communication between aircraft and satellites. In this article, we analyze coverage and security against wireless attacks of the novel satellite-based version of the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) technology. We compare it to the widely deployed terrestrial ADS-B system, which is known to be insecure and is inherently unable to provide coverage in some parts of the global airspace, such as oceans and polar regions. Our analysis shows that satellites can provide vast advantages in such non-surveillance areas. However, they are as fundamentally insecure as terrestrial ADS-B.
PDF Github Publication DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.01061. August 2019.
Abstract:In recent years, air traffic communication data has become easy to access, enabling novel research in many fields. Exploiting this new data source, a wide range of applications have emerged, from weather forecasting to stock market prediction, or the collection of intelligence about military and government movements. Typically, these applications require knowledge about the metadata of the aircraft, specifically its operator and the aircraft category. armasuisse Science + Technology , the R&D agency for the Swiss Armed Forces, has been developing Classi-Fly, a novel approach to obtain metadata about aircraft based on their movement patterns. We validate Classi-Fly using several hundred thousand flights collected through open source means, in conjunction with ground truth from publicly available aircraft registries containing more than 2 million aircraft. We show that we can obtain the correct aircraft category with an accuracy of greater than 88%. In cases, where no metadata is available, this approach can be used to create the data necessary for applications working with air traffic communication. Finally, we show that it is feasible to automatically detect particular sensitive aircraft such as police and surveillance aircraft using this method.
PDFMatthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Jon Harman, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.08039. May 2019.
Abstract:Many wireless communications systems found in aircraft lack standard security mechanisms, leaving them fundamentally vulnerable to attack. With affordable software-defined radios available, a novel threat has emerged, allowing a wide range of attackers to easily interfere with wireless avionic systems. Whilst these vulnerabilities are known, concrete attacks that exploit them are still novel and not yet well understood. This is true in particular with regards to their kinetic impact on the handling of the attacked aircraft and consequently its safety. To investigate this, we invited 30 Airbus A320 type-rated pilots to fly simulator scenarios in which they were subjected to attacks on their avionics. We implement and analyse novel wireless attacks on three safety-related systems: Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS). We found that all three analysed attack scenarios created significant control impact and cost of disruption through turnarounds, avoidance manoeuvres, and diversions. They further increased workload, distrust in the affected system, and in 38% of cases caused the attacked safety system to be switched off entirely. All pilots felt the scenarios were useful, with 93.3% feeling that simulator training for wireless attacks could be valuable.
PDFSimon Birnbach, Simon Eberz, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS). 2019.
Abstract:With the rising availability of smart devices (e.g., smart thermostats, lights, locks, etc.), they are increasingly combined into "smart homes". A key component of smart homes are event sensors that report physical events (such as doors opening or the light turning on) which can be triggered automatically by the system or manually by the user. However, data from these sensors are not always trustworthy. Both faults in the event sensors and involvement of active attackers can lead to reporting of events that did not physically happen (event spoofing). This is particularly critical, as smart homes can trigger event chains (e.g., turning the radiator off when a window is opened) without involvement of the user. The goal of this paper is to verify physical events using data from an ensemble of sensors (such as accelerometers or air pressure sensors) that are commonly found in smart homes. This approach both protects against event sensor faults and sophisticated attackers. In order to validate our system's performance, we set up a "smart home" in an office environment. We recognize 22 event types using 48 sensors over the course of two weeks. Using data from the physical sensors, we verify the event stream supplied by the event sensors. We consider two threat models: a zero-effort attacker who spoofs events at arbitrary times and an opportunistic attacker who has access to a live stream of sensor data to better time their attack. We achieve perfect classification for 9 out of 22 events and achieve a 0% false alarm rate at a detection rate exceeding 99.9% for 15 events. We also show that even a strong opportunistic attacker is inherently limited to spoofing few select events and that doing so involves lengthy waiting periods.
PDF Publication DOIRichard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). 2019.
Abstract:Electric vehicles (EVs) are proliferating quickly, along with the charging infrastructure for them. A new generation of charger technologies is emerging, handling more sensitive data and undertaking more complex interactions, while using the charging cable as the communication channel. This channel is used not only for charging control, but will soon handle billing, vehicle-to-grid operation, internet access and provide a platform for third-party apps — all with a public interface to the world. We highlight the threat posed by wireless attacks on the physical-layer of the Combined Charging System (CCS), a major standard for EV charging that is deployed in many thousands of locations worldwide and used by seven of the ten largest auto manufacturers globally. We show that design choices in the use of power-line communication (PLC) make the system particularly prone to popular electromagnetic side-channel attacks. We implement the first wireless eavesdropping tool for PLC networks and use it to observe the ISO 15118 network implementation underlying CCS, in a measurement campaign of 54 real charging sessions, using modern electric vehicles and state-of-the-art CCS chargers. We find that the unintentional wireless channel is sufficient to recover messages in the vast majority of cases, with traffic intercepted from an adjacent parking bay showing 91.8% of messages validating their CRC32 checksum. By examining the recovered traffic, we further find a host of privacy and security issues in existing charging infrastructure including plaintext MAC-layer traffic recovery, widespread absence of TLS in public locations and leakage of private information, including long-term unique identifiers. Of particular concern, elements of the recovered data are being used to authorise billing in existing charging implementations. We discuss the implications of pervasive susceptibility to known electromagnetic eavesdropping techniques, extract lessons learnt for future development and propose specific improvements to mitigate the problems in existing chargers.
PDF Video PublicationHenry Turner, Giulio Lovisotto, Ivan Martinovic.
European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS). 2019.
Abstract:As voice interfaces become more widely available they increasingly implement speaker recognition, to provide both personalized functionalities and security via authentication. In this paper, we present a method that transforms the voice of one person so that it resembles the voice of a victim, such that it can be used to deceive speaker recognition systems into believing an utterance was spoken by the victim. The transformation only requires short pieces of audio recordings from the source and victim voices, and does not require specific words to be spoken by the victim. We show that the attack can be improved by using a population of source voices and we provide a metric to identify promising source voices, from within such a population. We evaluate our attack along a set of dimensions, including: varying quantity, quality and types of known victim audio, verification and identification systems, white- and black-box models and both over-the-wire and over-the-air access. We test the audio transformation on two different proprietary models: (i) the Azure Speaker Recognition API and (ii) the Siri voice activation of an Apple iPhone, showing that individuals can easily be impersonated by obtaining as little as one minute of their audio, even when such audio is recorded in noisy conditions. With attempts from only three source voices, our attack achieves success rates of over 40% in the weakest assumption scenario against the Azure Verification API and rates of over 80% in all scenarios against Siri.
PDF Github Publication DOISimon Eberz, Giulio Lovisotto, Kasper B Rasmussen, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. 2019.
Abstract:In this work we address three overlooked practical challenges of continuous authentication systems based on eye movement biometrics: (i) changes in lighting conditions, (ii) task dependent features and the (iii) need for an accurate calibration phase. We collect eye movement data from 22 participants. To measure the effect of the three challenges, we collect data while varying the experimental conditions: users perform four different tasks, lighting conditions change over the course of the session and we collect data related to both accurate (user-specific) and inaccurate (generic) calibrations. To address changing lighting conditions, we identify the two main sources of light, i.e., screen brightness and ambient light, and we propose a pupil diameter correction mechanism based on these. We find that such mechanism can accurately adjust for the pupil shrinking or expanding in relation to the varying amount of light reaching the eye. To account for inaccurate calibrations, we augment the previously known feature set with new features based on binocular tracking, where the left and the right eye are tracked separately. We show that these features can be extremely distinctive even when using a generic calibration. We further apply a cross-task mapping function based on population data which systematically accounts for the dependency of features to tasks (e.g., reading a text and browsing a website lead to different eye movement dynamics). Using these enhancements, even while relaxing assumptions about the experimental conditions, we show that our system achieves significantly lower error rates compared to previous work. For intra-task authentication, without user-specific calibration and in variable screen brightness and ambient lighting, we achieve an equal error rate of 3.93% with only two minutes of training data. For the same setup but with constant screen brightness (e.g., as for a reading task) we can achieve equal error rates as low as of 1.88%.
PDF Publication DOIMatthias Schäfer, Martin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Markus Fuchs, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), 2018 IEEE/AIAA 37th. September 2018.
Abstract:Air traffic tracking platforms such as the OpenSky Network use crowdsourcing to track air traffic world wide. While crowdsourcing allows for unprecedented coverage, it comes with challenges concerning the integrity of the data. More specifically, by delegating the data collection task to a mostly unknown group of individuals, the network becomes vulnerable to data integrity breaches by inexperienced or malicious actors. Users might - intentionally or not - send faulty or fake data to the tracker and in this way threaten the integrity of the information provided by the network. In this paper, we provide unique insights into the data integrity challenges we faced during 6 years of operating the OpenSky Network. We analyze the different types of integrity breaches and discuss methods to detect and filter faulty data.
PDF Publication DOIMatthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic, Vincent Lenders.
18th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS 2018). July 2018.
Abstract:Despite the Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) being widely deployed for over twenty years, little scrutiny has been applied to it outside of the aviation community. Whilst originally utilized by commercial airlines to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Such a change has caused ACARS to be used far beyond its original mandate; to date no work has been undertaken to assess the extent of this especially with regard to privacy and the various stakeholder groups which use it. In this paper, we present an analysis of ACARS usage by privacy sensitive actors-military, government and business. We conduct this using data from the VHF (both traditional ACARS, and VDL mode 2) and satellite communications subnetworks. Based on more than two million ACARS messages collected over the course of 16 months, we demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches location privacy for all examined aviation stakeholder groups, explaining the types of messages used to cause this problem.We illustrate the challenges with three case studies-one for each stakeholder group-to show how much privacy sensitive information can be constructed with a handful of ACARS messages. We contextualize our findings with opinions on the issue of privacy in ACARS from 40 aviation industry professionals. From this, we explore recommendations for how to address these issues, including use of encryption and policy measures.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems. June 2018.
Abstract:In this paper, we argue that current state-of-the-art methods of aircraft localization such as multilateration are insufficient, in particular for modern crowdsourced air traffic networks with random, unplanned deployment geometry. We propose an alternative, a grid-based localization approach using the k-nearest neighbor (k -NN) algorithm, to deal with the identified shortcomings. Our proposal does not require any changes to the existing air traffic protocols and transmitters, and is easily implemented using only low-cost, commercial-off-the-shelf hardware. Using an algebraic multilateration algorithm for comparison, we evaluate our approach using real-world flight data collected with our collaborative sensor network OpenSky. We quantify its effectiveness in terms of aircraft location accuracy, surveillance coverage, and the verification of false position data. Our results show that the grid-based k-NN approach can increase the effective air traffic surveillance coverage compared to multilateration by a factor of up to 2.5. As it does not suffer from dilution of precision to the same extent, it is more robust in noisy environments and performs better in pre-existing, unplanned receiver deployments. We further find that the mean aircraft location accuracy can be increased by up to 41% in comparison with multilateration while also being able to pinpoint the origin of potential spoofing attacks conducted from the ground.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Cyber Conflict (CYCON), 2018 10th International Conference on. May 2018.
Abstract:In recent times, we have witnessed a trend in which communications data is increasingly collected and made open source by the public. A prominent example is the tracking of aircraft movements using unencrypted air traffic control (ATC) communication. This paper studies the implications of such new open source aircraft datasets on the operational privacy of military and government actors. We use publicly available aircraft metadata in conjunction with unfiltered ATC communication gathered from the collaborative sensor network OpenSky. We show that using these datasets, it is possible to collect, process and analyze large numbers of movements in an automated fashion, providing insights into potentially sensitive operations.
PDF Publication DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P) 2018. April 2018.
Abstract:This paper exploits publicly available aircraft meta data in conjunction with unfiltered air traffic communication gathered from a global collaborative sensor network to study the privacy impact of large-scale aircraft tracking on governments and public corporations. First, we use movement data of 542 verified aircraft used by 113 different governments to identify events and relationships in the real world. We develop a spatio-temporal clustering method which returns 47 public and 18 non-public meetings attended by dedicated government aircraft over the course of 18 months. Additionally, we illustrate the ease of analyzing the long-term behavior and relationships of aviation users through the example of foreign governments visiting Europe. Secondly, we exploit the same types of data to predict potential merger and acquisition (M&A) activities by 36 corporations listed on the US and European stock markets. We identify seven M&A cases, in all of which the buyer has used corporate aircraft to visit the target prior to the official announcement, on average 61 days before. Finally, we analyze five existing technical and non-technical mitigation options available to the individual stakeholders. We quantify their popularity and effectiveness, finding that despite their current widespread use, they are ineffective against the presented exploits. Consequently, we argue that regulatory and technical changes are required to be able to protect the privacy of non-commercial aviation users in the future.
PDF DOIRichard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
IFIP International Conference on ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection. 2018.
Abstract:Power line communication (PLC) networks are commonplace today, particularly within consumer home environments. They permit simple plug-and-play networking by leveraging the existing electrical wiring in buildings to transmit data as well as power. However, the ubiquity of this networking opportunity is often overlooked and permits an attacker, with only one-time access to an environment, to establish free, unmonitored and high-bandwidth network connectivity to the victim. However, the unsuitability of power wiring for high-frequency signalling means that PLC leaks radiated emissions. We demonstrate the detectability of this phenomenon in a real-world setting and introduce EMPower; a system that identifies the presence of hidden power line networking from analysis of the characteristic EM emissions in the frequency and time domains. We demonstrate the effectiveness of EMPower using a COTS radio receiver—identifying the presence of a network near-perfectly within the same room, even when idle, and with 74.6% accuracy two rooms away and on a different floor. Thus realising the capability to monitor an environment for unwanted power line networks.
PDF Publication DOISimon Eberz, Giulio Lovisotto, Andrea Patane, Marta Kwiatkowska, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
2018 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). 2018.
Abstract:Attacks on behavioral biometrics have become increasingly popular. Most research has been focused on presenting a previously obtained feature vector to the biometric sensor, often by the attacker training themselves to change their behavior to match that of the victim. However, obtaining the victim's biometric information may not be easy, especially when the user's template on the authentication device is adequately secured. As such, if the authentication device is inaccessible, the attacker may have to obtain data elsewhere. In this paper, we present an analytic framework that enables us to measure how easily features can be predicted based on data gathered in a different context (e.g., different sensor, performed task or environment). This framework is used to assess how resilient individual features or entire biometrics are against such cross-context attacks. In order to be able to compare existing biometrics with regard to this property, we perform a user study to gather biometric data from 30 participants and five biometrics (ECG, eye movements, mouse movements, touchscreen dynamics and gait) in a variety of contexts. We make this dataset publicly available online. Our results show that many attack scenarios are viable in practice as features are easily predicted from a variety of contexts. All biometrics include features that are particularly predictable (e.g., amplitude features for ECG or curvature for mouse movements). Overall, we observe that cross-context attacks on eye movements, mouse movements and touchscreen inputs are comparatively easy while ECG and gait exhibit much more chaotic cross-context changes.
PDF Publication DOIChris Xiaoxuan Lu, Bowen Du, Hongkai Wen, Sen Wang, Andrew Markham, Ivan Martinovic, Yiran Shen, Niki Trigoni.
ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp). 2018.
Abstract:Demand for smartwatches has taken off in recent years with new models which can run independently from smartphones and provide more useful features, becoming first-class mobile platforms. One can access online banking or even make payments on a smartwatch without a paired phone. This makes smartwatches more attractive and vulnerable to malicious attacks, which to date have been largely overlooked. In this paper, we demonstrate Snoopy, a password extraction and inference system which is able to accurately infer passwords entered on Android/Apple watches within 20 attempts, just by eavesdropping on motion sensors. Snoopy uses a uniform framework to extract the segments of motion data when passwords are entered, and uses novel deep neural networks to infer the actual passwords. We evaluate the proposed Snoopy system in the real-world with data from 362 participants and show that our system offers a ~ 3-fold improvement in the accuracy of inferring passwords compared to the state-of-the-art, without consuming excessive energy or computational resources. We also show that Snoopy is very resilient to user and device heterogeneity: it can be trained on crowd-sourced motion data (e.g. via Amazon Mechanical Turk), and then used to attack passwords from a new user, even if they are wearing a different model. This paper shows that, in the wrong hands, Snoopy can potentially cause serious leaks of sensitive information. By raising awareness, we invite the community and manufacturers to revisit the risks of continuous motion sensing on smart wearable devices.
PDF DOIIvo Sluganovic, Matej Serbec, Ante Derek, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 33rd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC 2017). December 2017.
Abstract:Augmented Reality (AR) devices continuously scan their environment in order to naturally overlay virtual objects onto user's view of the physical world. In contrast to Virtual Reality, where one's environment is fully replaced with a virtual one, one of AR's "killer features" is co-located collaboration, in which multiple users interact with the same combination of virtual and real objects. Microsoft recently released HoloLens, the first consumer-ready augmented reality headset that needs no outside markers to achieve precise inside-out spatial mapping, which allows centimeter-scale hologram positioning.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthias Schäfer, Rui Pinheiro, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE Transactions on Intelligent Transportation Systems. June 2017.
Abstract:More than a dozen wireless technologies are used by air traffic communication systems during different flight phases. From a conceptual perspective, all of them are insecure, as security was never part of their design. Recent contributions from academic and hacking communities have exploited this inherent vulnerability to demonstrate attacks on some of these technologies. However, not all of these contributions have resonated widely within aviation circles. At the same time, the security community lacks certain aviation domain knowledge, preventing aviation authorities from giving credence to their findings. In this survey, we aim to reconcile the view of the security community and the perspective of aviation professionals concerning the safety of air traffic communication technologies. To achieve this, we first provide a systematization of the applications of wireless technologies upon which civil aviation relies. Based on these applications, we comprehensively analyze vulnerabilities and existing attacks. We further survey the existing research on countermeasures and categorize it into approaches that are applicable in the short term and research of secure new technologies deployable in the long term. Since not all of the required aviation knowledge is codified in academic publications, we additionally examine the existing aviation standards and survey 242 international aviation experts. Besides their domain knowledge, we also analyze the awareness of members of the aviation community concerning the security of wireless systems and collect their expert opinions on the potential impact of concrete attack scenarios using these technologies.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Cyber Conflict (CYCON), 2017 9th International Conference on. May 2017.
Abstract:Protecting the security of the cyber-physical systems that make up the world's critical infrastructures has been a recent hotly debated topic. Legacy wireless communication infrastructure is often an impediment to quickly improving these crucial systems, as cryptographic solutions prove impossible to deploy. In this article, we propose the establishment of a separate verification layer for sensitive wireless data powered by crowdsourced sensors connected to the Internet and apply it to the aviation domain. We first validate the need for independent data verification in air traffic control networks, where all wireless communication is conducted in the clear and thus subject to manipulation. To counter this threat, we develop a comprehensive model for the verification of wireless communication based on massively distributed data collection and outline how it can be used to immediately improve the security of unprotected air traffic control networks. By combining several different methods based on the content and the physical characteristics of aircraft signals, our system is able to detect typical injection, modification and jamming attacks. We further develop a trust model to defend against potential insider threats based on compromised sensors. We illustrate our approach using the crowdsourced sensor network OpenSky, which captures large parts of civil air traffic communication around the globe. We analyse the security of our approach and show that it can quickly, cheaply, and effectively defend against even sophisticated attacks.
PDF DOIMatthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
ArXiv e-prints. May 2017.
Abstract:The manner in which Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is being used has significantly changed over time. Whilst originally used by commercial airliners to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Since ACARS messages are still mostly sent in the clear over a wireless channel, any sensitive information sent with ACARS can potentially lead to a privacy breach for users. Naturally, different stakeholders consider different types of data sensitive. In this paper we propose a privacy framework matching aviation stakeholders to a range of sensitive information types and assess the impact for each. Based on more than one million ACARS messages, collected over several months, we then demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches privacy for all stakeholder groups. We further support our findings with a number of cases of significant privacy issues for each group and analyze the impact of such leaks. While it is well-known that ACARS messages are susceptible to eavesdropping attacks, this work is the first to quantify the extent and impact of privacy leakage in the real world for the relevant aviation stakeholders.
PDFMatthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2017. April 2017.
Abstract:Recent research has shown that a number of existing wireless avionic systems lack encryption and are thus vulnerable to eavesdropping and message injection attacks. The Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is no exception to this rule with 99% of the traffic being sent in plaintext. However, a small portion of the traffic coming mainly from privately-owned and government aircraft is encrypted, indicating a stronger requirement for security and privacy by those users. In this paper, we take a closer look at this protected communication and analyze the cryptographic solution being used. Our results show that the cipher used for this encryption is a mono-alphabetic substitution cipher, broken with little effort. We assess the impact on privacy and security to its unassuming users by characterizing months of real-world data, decrypted by breaking the cipher and recovering the keys. Our results show that the decrypted data leaks privacy sensitive information including existence, intent and status of aircraft owners.
PDF DOISimon Birnbach, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 24th Annual Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). 2017.
Abstract:Author(s): Simon Birnbach, Richard Baker, Ivan Martinovic Download: Paper (PDF) Date: 27 Feb 2017 Document Type: Reports Additional Documents: Slides Video Associated Event: NDSS Symposium 2017 Abstract: Drones are becoming increasingly popular for hobbyists and recreational use. But with this surge in popularity comes increased risk to privacy as the technology makes it easy to spy on people … Continued
PDF DOIGiulio Lovisotto, Raghav Malik, Ivo Sluganovic, Marc Roeschlin, Paul Trueman, Ivan Martinovic.
University of Oxford. 2017.
Abstract:Banks and the wider financial services sector are witnessing sharp increases in the number of users interacting with them through digital channels. In light of these changes, traditional password-based mechanisms are becoming insecure, inconvenient, or both, as evidenced by the rise of digital fraud rates and users who report frustration with authenticating to financial services. Biometrics are an alternative that offer potential usability improvements, while retaining or improving the security guarantees. This paper is motivated by the need for a demystification of the deployment of a biometric system for financial services use cases. This paper is based on two separate studies: (1) a longitudinal study of users' attitudes towards the adoption of biometric authentication for online payment use cases; and (2) an opinion survey of a targeted group of financial services professionals. The findings of these studies are two-fold. The user study shows that users (>90%) believe biometrics are more secure and convenient than passwords, and that they are willing to adopt biometrics to replace existing password-based authentication. Nonetheless, the industry survey highlights gaps in experience and importance on different aspects of deploying biometric systems: only 36% of respondents are familiar with biometrics, compared to 88% of them that would be involved in their deployment. These gaps inhibit adoption of biometrics, as they prevent effective communication and collaboration among different entities involved in the process of deployment. In this paper, we use the insights gathered in the studies to identify five key factors that contribute to the success of a biometric system in financial services. For each factor, we outline and discuss the main challenges and trends that need to be analysed before deployment, combining perspectives from academia, industry groups, and regulators. The Five Factor Framework provides a broad range of guidelines and necessary considerations for the deployment of mobile biometrics in financial services.
PDFMatthias Schäfer, Martin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Markus Fuchs, Rui Pinheiro, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), 2016 IEEE/AIAA 35th. September 2016.
Abstract:This paper provides up-to-date statistics on SSR Mode S and 1090ES ADS-B usage from the OpenSky Network. By analyzing the large host of real-world data collected by OpenSky, we provide insights on the current composition of Mode S downlink communications, aircraft equipage, interrogation patterns and much more. We publish up-to-date, empirically validated numbers on the status of the ongoing ADS-B deployment based on data collected over large areas in Europe, North America, and New Zealand, and categorize these aircraft by incorporating publicly available data sources.
PDF DOISimon Eberz, Kasper B. Rasmussen, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security. June 2016.
Abstract:We introduce a novel biometric based on distinctive eye movement patterns. The biometric consists of 20 features that allow us to reliably distinguish users based on differences in these patterns. We leverage this distinguishing power along with the ability to gauge the users’ task familiarity, that is, level of knowledge, to address insider threats. In a controlled experiment, we test how both time and task familiarity influence eye movements and feature stability, and how different subsets of features affect the classifier performance. These feature subsets can be used to tailor the eye movement biometric to different authentication methods and threat models. Our results show that eye movement biometrics support reliable and stable continuous authentication of users. We investigate different approaches in which an attacker could attempt to use inside knowledge to mimic the legitimate user. Our results show that while this advance knowledge is measurable, it does not increase the likelihood of successful impersonation. In order to determine the time stability of our features, we repeat the experiment twice within 2 weeks. The results indicate that we can reliably authenticate users over the entire period. We show that lower sampling rates provided by low-cost hardware pose a challenge, but that reliable authentication is possible even at the rate of 50Hz commonly available with consumer-level devices. In a second set of experiments, we evaluate how our authentication system performs across a variety of real-world tasks, including reading, writing, and web browsing. We discuss the advantages and limitations of our approach in detail and give practical insights on the use of this biometric in a real-world environment.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Cyber Conflict (CYCON), 2016 8th International Conference on. May 2016.
Abstract:We analyse the impact of new wireless technology threat models on cyber power, using the aviation context as an example. The ongoing move from traditional air traffic control systems such as radar and voice towards enhanced surveillance and communications systems using modern data networks causes a marked shift in the security of the aviation environment. Implemented through the European SESAR and the US American NextGen programmes, several new air traffic control and communication protocols are currently being rolled out that have been in the works for decades. Unfortunately, during their development the shifting wireless technology threat models were not taken into account. As technology related to digital avionics is getting more widely accessible, traditional electronic warfare threat models are fast becoming obsolete. This paper defines a novel and realistic threat model based on the up-to-date capabilities of different types of threat agents and their impact on a digitalised aviation communication system. After analysing how the changing technological environment affects the security of aviation technologies, current and future, we discuss the reasons preventing the aviation industry from quickly improving the security of its wireless protocols. Among these reasons, we identify the existing tradition of the industry, the prevalence of legacy hard- and software, major cost pressures, slow development cycles, and a narrow focus on safety (as opposed to security). Finally, we analyse how this major technological shift informs the future of cyber power and conflict in the aviation environment by looking at tangible effects for state actors.
PDF DOIBen-Adar Bessos, Mai, Simon Birnbach, Amir Herzberg, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy (CPS-SPC). 2016.
Abstract:We study the trade-off between the benefits obtained by communication, vs. the risks due to exposure of the location of the transmitter. To study this problem, we introduce a game between two teams of mobile agents, the P-bots team and the E-bots team. The E-bots attempt to eavesdrop and collect information, while evading the P-bots; the P-bots attempt to prevent this by performing patrol and pursuit. The game models a typical use-case of micro-robots, i.e., their use for (industrial) espionage. We evaluate strategies for both teams, using analysis and simulations.
DOIRichard Baker, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the 2nd ACM Workshop on Cyber-Physical Systems Security and Privacy. 2016.
Abstract:We present a technique for performing secure location verification of position claims by measuring the time-difference of arrival (TDoA) between a fixed receiver node and a mobile one. The mobile node moves randomly in order to substantially increase the difficulty for an attacker to make false messages appear genuine. We explore the performance and requirements of such a system in the context of verifying aircraft position claims made over the Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) system through the use of simulation and find that it correctly detects false claims with a peak accuracy of over 97\% for the most complex attack modelled; requiring only 75m of deviation between the reported position and the actual position in order for a false claim to be detected. We then report on our design for a mobile receiver and our construction of a prototype using low-cost COTS equipment. We discuss some additional benefits of incorporating a mobile node, examine the difficulties to be overcome and explore the applicability of the approach in other location verification use-cases.
DOISimon Eberz, Kasper B. Rasmussen, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). February 2015.
Abstract:Author(s): Simon Eberz, Kasper B. Rasmussen, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic Download: Paper (PDF) Date: 7 Feb 2015 Document Type: Briefing Papers Additional Documents: Slides Associated Event: NDSS Symposium 2015 Abstract: We introduce a novel biometric based on distinctive eye movement patterns. The biometric consists of 21 features that allow us to reliably distinguish users based … Continued
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials. 2015.
Abstract:Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next-generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, in addition to being crucial to many other interest groups in aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation circles and in the academic community. Due to recently published proof-of-concept attacks, the topic is becoming ever more pressing, particularly with the deadline for mandatory implementation in most airspaces fast approaching. This survey first summarizes the attacks and problems that have been reported in relation to ADS-B security. Thereafter, it surveys both the theoretical and practical efforts that have been previously conducted concerning these issues, including possible countermeasures. In addition, the survey seeks to go beyond the current state of the art and gives a detailed assessment of security measures that have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.
PDF DOIMatthias Schäfer, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic, Matthias Wilhelm.
ACM/IEEE International Conference on Information Processing in Sensor Networks (IPSN). April 2014.
Abstract:Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is one of the key components of the next generation air transportation system. Since ADS-B will become mandatory by 2020 for most airspaces, it is important that aspects such as capacity, applications, and security are investigated by an independent research community. However, large-scale real-world data was previously only accessible to a few closed industrial and governmental groups because it required specialized and expensive equipment. To enable researchers to conduct experimental studies based on real data, we developed OpenSky, a sensor network based on low-cost hardware connected over the Internet. OpenSky is based on off-the-shelf ADS-B sensors distributed to volunteers throughout Central Europe. It covers 720,000 km2, is able to capture more than 30% of the commercial air traffic in Europe, and enables researchers to analyze billions of ADS-B messages. In this paper, we report on the challenges we faced during the development and deployment of this participatory network and the insights we gained over the last two years of operations as a service to academic research groups. We go on to provide real-world insights about the possibilities and limitations of such low-cost sensor networks concerning air traffic surveillance and further applications such as multilateration.
PDF DOIKasper Bonne Rasmussen, Marc Roeschlin, Ivan Martinovic, Gene Tsudik.
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS). February 2014.
Abstract:We propose a new biometric based on the human body's response to an electric square pulse signal, called pulse-response. We explore how this biometric can be used to enhance security in the context of two example applications: (1) an additional authentication mechanism in PIN entry systems, and (2) a means of continuous authentication on a secure terminal. The pulse-response biometric is effective because each human body exhibits a unique response to a signal pulse applied at the palm of one hand, and measured at the palm of the other. Using a prototype setup, we show that users can be correctly identified, with high probability, in a matter of seconds. This identification mechanism integrates well with other established methods and offers a reliable additional layer of security, either on a continuous basis or at login time. We build a proof-of-concept prototype and perform experiments to assess the feasibility of pulse-response as a practical biometric. The results are very encouraging, achieving accuracies of 100% over a static data set, and 88% over a data set with samples taken over several weeks.
PDF DOIDaniel S. Berger, Francesco Gringoli, Nicolò Facchi, Ivan Martinovic, Jens Schmitt.
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless & Mobile Networks. 2014.
Abstract:Frequency jamming is the fiercest attack tool to disrupt wireless communication and its malicious aspects have received much attention in the literature. Yet, several recent works propose to turn the table and employ so-called friendly jamming for the benefit of a wireless network. For example, recently proposed friendly jamming applications include hiding communication channels, injection attack defense, and access control. This work investigates the practical viability of friendly jamming by applying it in a real-world network. To that end, we implemented a reactive and frame-selective jammer on a consumer grade IEEE 802.11 access point. Equipped with this, we conducted a three weeks real-world study on the jammer's performance and side-effects on legitimate traffic (the cost of jamming) in a university office environment. Our results provide detailed insights on crucial factors governing the trade-off between the effectiveness of friendly jamming (we evaluated up to 13 jammers) and its cost. In particular, we observed -- what we call the power amplification phenomenon -- an effect that aggravates the known hidden station problem when the number of jammers increases. However, we also find evidence that this effect can be alleviated by collaboration between jammers, which again enables effective and minimally invasive friendly jamming.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Matthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Communications Magazine, IEEE. 2014.
Abstract:Air traffic is continuously increasing worldwide, with both manned and unmanned aircraft looking to coexist in the same airspace in the future. Next generation air traffic management systems are crucial in successfully handling this growth and improving the safety of billions of future passengers. The Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system is a core part of this future. Unlike traditional radar systems, this technology empowers aircraft to automatically broadcast their locations and intents, providing enhanced situational awareness. This article discusses important issues with the current state of ADS-B as it is being rolled out. We report from our OpenSky sensor network in Central Europe, which is able to capture about 30 percent of the European commercial air traffic. We analyze the 1090 MHz communication channel to understand the current state and its behavior under the increasing traffic load. Furthermore, the article considers important security challenges faced by ADS-B. Our insights are intended to help identify open research issues, furthering new interest and developments in this field.
PDF DOIMatthias Wilhelm, Ivan Martinovic, Jens Schmitt.
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications (JSAC) - Signal Processing Techniques for Wireless Physical Layer Security. September 2013.
Abstract:Key management in wireless sensor networks faces several unique challenges. The scale, resource limitations, and new threats such as node capture suggest the use of in-network key generation. However, the cost of such schemes is often high because their security is based on computational complexity. Recently, several research contributions justified experimentally that the wireless channel itself can be used to generate information-theoretic secure keys. By exchanging sampling messages during device movement, a bit string is derived known only to the two involved entities. Yet, movement is not the only option to generate randomness: the channel response strongly depends on the signal frequency as well. In this work, we introduce a key generation protocol based on the frequency-selectivity of multipath fading channels. The practical advantage of this approach is that it does not require device movement during key establishment. Thus the frequent case of a sensor network with static nodes is supported. We show the protocol's applicability by implementing it on MICAz motes, and evaluating its robustness and security through experiments and analysis. The error correction property of the protocol mitigates the effects of measurement errors and temporal effects, giving rise to an agreement rate of over 97 %.
PDF DOIMario Frank, Ralf Biedert, Eugene Ma, Ivan Martinovic, Dawn Song.
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security. January 2013.
Abstract:We investigate whether a classifier can continuously authenticate users based on the way they interact with the touchscreen of a smart phone. We propose a set of 30 behavioral touch features that can be extracted from raw touchscreen logs and demonstrate that different users populate distinct subspaces of this feature space. In a systematic experiment designed to test how this behavioral pattern exhibits consistency over time, we collected touch data from users interacting with a smart phone using basic navigation maneuvers, i.e., up–down and left–right scrolling. We propose a classification framework that learns the touch behavior of a user during an enrollment phase and is able to accept or reject the current user by monitoring interaction with the touch screen. The classifier achieves a median equal error rate of 0% for intrasession authentication, 2%–3% for intersession authentication, and below 4% when the authentication test was carried out one week after the enrollment phase. While our experimental findings disqualify this method as a standalone authentication mechanism for long-term authentication, it could be implemented as a means to extend screen-lock time or as a part of a multimodal biometric authentication system.
PDF DOIArman Boehm, Dongqu Chen, Mario Frank, Ling Huang, Cynthia Kuo, Tihomir Lolic, Ivan Martinovic, Dawn Song.
Proceedings of the 2013 International Conference on Privacy and Security in Mobile Systems (successor of MobiSec). Proceedings in preparation.. 2013.
Abstract:Face authentication is commonly offered as an alternative to passwords for device unlock. However, available face authentication systems are vulnerable to simple spoofing attacks. We demonstrate the impact of image quality on spoofing, using low resolution photo representative of those commonly posted online. We also show that videos and slideshows of images at different angles, and crude 3D avatars are effective. To defend against these vulnerabilities, we propose a face authentication system that includes a secrecy challenge. We present SAFE (Secure Authentication with Face and Eyes1), an improved face authentication method that uses a commodity gaze tracker to input a secret. During authentication, the user must not only show her face but also gaze at a secret icon that moves across the screen. Using a novel method for estimating the noise level in the gaze tracking data, SAFE adapts the system's parameters to enable secure, hands-free authentication.
PDF DOIMatthias Schäfer, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
Applied Cryptography and Network Security (ACNS’13). 2013.
Abstract:This work studies the security of next generation air traffic surveillance technology based on Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is already supported by a majority of international aircraft and will become mandatory in 2020 for most airspaces worldwide. While it is known that ADS-B might be susceptible to different spoofing attacks, the complexity and impact of launching these attacks has been debated controversially by the air traffic control community. Yet, the literature remains unclear on the requirements of launching ADS-B attacks in real-world environments, and on the constraints which affect their feasibility. In this paper, we take a scientific approach to systematically evaluate realistic ADS-B attacks. Our objective is to shed light on the practicability of different threats and to quantify the main factors that impact the success of such attacks. Our results reveal some bad news: attacks on ADS-B can be inexpensive and highly successful. Using a controlled experimental design, we offer insights from a real-world feasibility analysis that leads to the conclusion that any safety-critical air traffic decision process should not rely exclusively on the ADS-B system.
PDF DOIMartin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic.
DCS. 2013.
Abstract:Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) is the communications protocol currently being rolled out as part of next generation air transportation systems. As the heart of modern air traffic control, it will play an essential role in the protection of two billion passengers per year, besides being crucial to many other interest groups connected with aviation. The inherent lack of security measures in the ADS-B protocol has long been a topic in both the aviation and the academic community and is becoming ever more pressing with the quickly approaching mandatory implementation in most airspaces. This survey first analyzes the problems that have been reported about the ADS-B protocol in relation to its security. We then go on to survey the efforts that have been previously made concerning these problems, including possible countermeasures that have been proposed. Furthermore, the survey assesses additional security measures which have been developed more generally for related wireless networks such as sensor networks and vehicular ad hoc networks, including a taxonomy of all considered approaches.
PDFTim Stöber, Mario Frank, Jens Schmitt, Ivan Martinovic.
Proceedings of the sixth ACM Conference on Security and Privacy in Wireless and Mobile Networks. 2013.
Abstract:The overall network traffic patterns generated by today's smartphones result from the typically large and diverse set of installed applications. In addition to the traffic generated by the user, most applications generate characteristic traffic from their background activities, such as periodic update requests or server synchronisation. Although the encryption of transmitted data in 3G networks prevents an eavesdropper from analysing the content, periodic traffic patterns leak side-channel information like timing and data volume. In this work, we extract such side-channel features from network traffic generated from the most popular applications, such as Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, Dropbox, and others, and evaluate whether they can be used to reliably identify a smartphone. By computing fingerprints from ≈ 6 hours of background traffic, we show that 15 minutes of monitored traffic suffice to reliably identify a smartphone based on its behavioural fingerprint with a success probability of 90%.
PDF DOISimon Eberz, Martin Strohmeier, Matthias Wilhelm, Ivan Martinovic.
17th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS). September 2012.
Abstract:Generating secret keys using physical properties of the wireless channel has recently become a popular research area. The main security assumption of these protocols is that a sufficiently distant adversary is unable to guess a generated secret due to the unpredictable behavior of multipath signal propagation. In this paper, we introduce a practical and efficient man-in-the-middle attack against such protocols. Using this attack, we demonstrate: (i) intentional sabotaging of key generation schemes, which leads to a high key disagreement rate, and (ii) a key recovery that reveals up to 47% of the generated secret bits. We analyze statistical countermeasures (often proposed in related work) and show that attempting to detect such attacks results in a high false positive rate, questioning the overall benefit of such schemes. We implement and experimentally validate the attacks using off-the-shelf hardware, without assuming any technological advantage for the adversary.
PDF DOIIvan Martinovic, Doug Davies, Mario Frank, Daniele Perito, Tomas Ros, Dawn Song.
Proceedings of the 21st USENIX Conference on Security Symposium. August 2012.
Abstract:Brain computer interfaces (BCI) are becoming increasingly popular in the gaming and entertainment industries.Consumer-grade BCI devices are available for a few hundred dollars and are used in a variety of applications, such as video games, hands-free keyboards, or as an assistant in relaxation training.There are application stores similar to the ones used for smart phones, where application developers have access to an API to collect data from the BCI devices.The security risks involved in using consumer-grade BCI devices have never been studied and the impact of malicious software with access to the device is unexplored.We take a first step in studying the security implications of such devices and demonstrate that this upcoming technology could be turned against users to reveal their private and secret information.We use inexpensive electroencephalography (EEG) based BCI devices to test the feasibility of simple, yet effective, attacks.The captured EEG signal could reveal the user's private information about, e.g., bank cards, PIN numbers, area of living, the knowledge of the known persons.This is the first attempt to study the security implications of consumergrade BCI devices.We show that the entropy of the private information is decreased on the average by approximately 15 % -40 % compared to random guessing attacks.
PDFRalf Biedert, Mario Frank, Ivan Martinovic, Dawn Song.
Future Information Technology, Application, and Service. July 2012.
Abstract:User authentication is an important and usually final barrier to detect and prevent illicit access. Nonetheless it can be broken or tricked, leaving the system and its data vulnerable to abuse. In this paper we consider how eye tracking can enable the system to hypothesize if the user is familiar with the system he operates, or if he is an unfamiliar intruder. Based on an eye tracking experiment conducted with 12 users and various stimuli, we investigate which conditions and measures are most suited for such an intrusion detection. We model the user's gaze behavior as a selector for information flow via the relative conditional gaze entropy. We conclude that this feature provides the most discriminative results with static and repetitive stimuli.
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